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A New and EÆient Fail{StopSignature ShemeWilly Susilo1, Rei Safavi-Naini1, Mar Gysin2 and JenniferSeberry11 Centre for Computer Seurity Researh, Shool of IT and CS, University of Wollongong,Wollongong 2522, AUSTRALIA2Shool of Information Tehnology, Townsville, QLD 4811, AUSTRALIAEmail: fwsusilo, reiguow.edu.au, mars.ju.edu.au, jennieuow.edu.auSeurity of ordinary digital signature shemes relies on a omputational assump-tion. Fail-stop signature shemes provide seurity for a sender against a forgerwith unlimited omputational power by enabling the sender to provide a proof offorgery, if it ours. In this paper, we give an eÆient fail-stop signature shemethat uses two hard problems, disrete logarithm and fatorisation, as the basisof reeiver's seurity. We show that the sheme has provable seurity againstadaptively hosen message attak and is the most eÆient sheme with respet tothe ratio of the message length to the signature length. The sheme provides aneÆient solution to signing messages up to 1881 bits.Keywords: Fail-Stop Signature Shemes, Disrete Logarithm, Fatorisation, Optimality,EÆieny1. INTRODUCTIONDigital signatures, introdued in [7℄, are the most im-portant ryptographi primitive for providing authen-tiation in eletroni world. The original denition ofdigital signature was subsequently revised [8℄ to ensureseurity against a more stringent type of attak knownas adaptive hosen message attak. Despite the strongerrequirement, seurity in digital signature shemes re-mains omputational and hene an enemy with unlim-ited omputing power an always forge a signature. Werefer to this type of signature as an ordinary signaturesheme.In an ordinary signature sheme if a forgery oursthe sender must bear its onsequenes and there is noway for him to show that a forgery has ourred. Thisis unavoidable as if the signer is allowed to disavow aforged signature, sine there is no way of distinguishingbetween a forged from one generated by the signer, thesigner might also disavow his own signature resultingin vanishing aountability in the system. This meansthat the seurity for the signer is omputational andif the underlying omputational assumption is brokena forged signature an be irrefutably reated. On theother hand the seurity of the reeivers is unonditionalas veriation is a publi proess.To provide protetion against forgeries of an enemywith unlimited omputational power, fail-stop signature(FSS) shemes were proposed [25, 18, 14℄. In a FSS, inthe ase of forgery, the presumed signer an provide aproof that a forgery has happened. This is by showing
that the underlying omputational assumption of thesystem is broken. The system will be stopped at thisstage- hene the name fail-stop. In this way, a polyno-mially bounded signer an be proteted against a forgerwith unlimited omputational power. We note that anunbounded reeiver an forge a signature but again aproof of forgery shows that the omputational assump-tion of the system is broken and the system will bestopped. It an be shown that (Theorem 3.2 [14℄) aseure FSS an be used to onstrut an ordinary digi-tal signature that is seure in the sense of [8℄ and so afail-stop signature sheme provides a stronger notion ofseurity.In a FSS there are a number of partiipants: a signerwho signs a message that is veriable by everyone withaess to his publi key, and is proteted against forgeryof an unbounded enemy, one or more reipients and aentre who is trusted by the reipient. All the reeiverswho take part in the key generation proess and areonvined about the goodness of the key, are protetedfrom repudiation of the signature by the signer. There isanother group of partiipants, the so-alled risk-bearers,suh as insurane ompanies, who will bear a loss if aproof of forgery is aepted and hene a signature isinvalidated. For simpliity we do not make any distin-tion between a reipient and a risk bearer.In a FSS, the signer and the reipients are assumed tobe polynomially bounded, while the enemy is assumedto have unlimited omputational power [24, 23, 17℄. Asystem may be designed for one or more reipients. It isimportant to note that a 'single reipient' system only
refers to the protetion provided against signer's repu-diation, and signature veriation (alled testing in theontext of FSS) an always be performed by anyone whohas aess to the publi key. That is, a single reipientsystem an be seen as an ordinary signature with theadded property that a designated reipient is protetedagainst disavowal of the signature by the signer, andthe signer is proteted against an all powerful forger.These kinds of requirements are very ommon in ele-troni ommere systems when a ustomer primarilyinterats with a single nanial institution, suh as abank. In this ase, it is reasonable to assume that thebank is more powerful and the ustomer requires pro-tetion against possible forgeries of the bank. At thesame time, the bank must be ensured that the signerannot repudiate his signature. Using a FSS with a sin-gle reipient ahieves both these requirements.In a single reipient FSS, the role of the trusted entreis played by the reipient and hene no trusted entreis required. For a general FSS, eliminating the entrerequires a seure multi-party omputation (for example,[18, 19, 22℄).A FSS in its basi form is a one-time digital signa-ture that an only be used for signing a single message.However, it is possible to extend a FSS sheme to beused for signing multiple messages [5, 24, 16, 1℄.To assess eÆieny of a FSS sheme a number of ri-teria, inluding the lengths of the signature, the seretkey and the publi key, together with the amount ofomputation and ommuniation required for signaturegeneration and veriation (testing), are used.1.1. Previous WorksThe rst onstrution of fail-stop signature [25℄ uses aone-time signature sheme (similar to [11℄) and resultsin bit by bit signing of the message and so is very im-pratial.In [15℄ an eÆient single-reipient FSS to protetlients in an on-line payment system, is proposed. Themain disadvantage of this system is that signature gen-eration is a 3-round protool between the signer and thereipient and so is very expensive in terms of ommuni-ation. The size of the signature is twie the length ofthe message.In [24℄, an eÆient FSS that uses the diÆulty of thedisrete logarithm problem as the underlying assump-tion is presented. In the ase of a forgery, the presumedsigner an solve an instane of the disrete logarithmproblem, and prove that the underlying assumption isbroken. This is the most eÆient sheme known so farand will be referred to as vHP sheme.In [14, 17℄, a formal denition of FSS shemes is givenand a general onstrution using bundling homomor-phism is proposed. The important property of this on-strution is that it is provably seure against the moststringent type of attak, that is adaptive hosen mes-sage attak [9℄. The proof of forgery is by showing two
dierent signatures on the same message, the forged oneand the one generated by the valid signer. To verify theproof of forgery the two signatures are shown to ol-lide under the 'bundling homomorphism'. An instaneof this onstrution uses the diÆulty of fatoring asthe underlying omputational assumption of the system[23℄.It is shown [14, 17℄ that vHP sheme is in fat an in-stantiation of this general onstrution and so has prov-able seurity. This ombined with eÆieny has madevHP sheme the benhmark for FSS shemes.The existene ondition for FSS is relaxed in [2, 19,23℄ and it is shown that a FSS only exists if one-waypermutations exist.In [22℄, an RSA-based FSS is proposed in whih theunderlying intratability assumption is the diÆulty offatoring and the proof of forgery is by showing the non-trivial fators of the modulus. In this sheme the sizeof the signature is twie that of the vHP sheme (fourtimes the size of the message) and ompared with [24℄,has equal or worse performane in all other aspets ofinterest. The proof of seurity is through a number oftheorems that bound the suess probabilities of dier-ent attakers.1.2. Our ContributionsIn this paper, we propose a new FSS sheme that is al-most as eÆient as vHP sheme and its seurity relieson two well-aepted omputational assumptions, Dis-rete Logarithm and Fatorisation. We introdue a newmeasure of eÆieny that is related to eÆient use ofommuniation bandwidth and show that our shemeoutperforms vHP sheme (and all other shemes thatare based on fatorisation problem). We prove thatthe suess hane of an unbounded forger is limited bythe reipient's seurity parameter while signer's seurityagainst adaptive hosen message attak is guaranteed toa level determined by the sender's seurity parameter.The proof of forgery is by revealing the non-trivial fa-tors of the modulus. We inorporate the idea from [3℄for the onstrution of our sheme. Finally, we omparethe optimality and eÆieny between our sheme andvHP sheme.The paper is organised as follows. In setion 2, wepresent the basi onepts and denitions of FSS, andbriey review the general onstrution and its relevantseurity properties. In setion 3, we present our FSSonstrution, show that it is an instane of the generalonstrution [14℄ and hene provide omplete proof ofseurity. In setion 4, we introdue the notions of op-timality and eÆieny, and give a fair omparison be-tween our sheme and the other existing shemes basedon these notions. Finally, setion 5 onludes the paper.
2. PRELIMINARIESIn this setion, we briey reall relevant notions, deni-tions and requirements of fail-stop signatures and referthe reader to [18, 17, 14℄ for a more omplete aount.2.1. NotationsThe length of a number n is the length of its binary rep-resentation and is denoted by jnj2. pjq means p dividesq. The ring of integers modulo a number n is denotedby Zn, and its multipliative group, whih ontains onlythe integers relatively prime to n, by Zn. Let N denotethe natural numbers.2.2. Review of Fail-Stop Signatures ShemesSimilar to an ordinary digital signature sheme, a fail-stop signature sheme onsists of one polynomial timeprotool and two polynomial time algorithms.1. Key generation: is a two party protool betweenthe signer and the entre to generate a pair of seretkey, sk, and publi key, pk. This is dierent fromordinary signature shemes where key generation isperformed by the signer individually and withoutthe involvement of the reeiver.2. Sign: is the algorithm used for signature genera-tion. For a message m and using the seret key sk,the signature is given by y = sign(sk;m).3. Test: is the algorithm for testing aeptability of asignature. For a message m and signature y, andgiven the publi key pk, the algorithm produes anok response if the signature is aeptable under pk.That is test(pk;m; y) ?= ok.A FSS also inludes two more polynomial time algo-rithms:4. Proof: is an algorithm for proving a forgery;5. Proof-test: is an algorithm for verifying that theproof of forgery is valid.A seure fail-stop signature sheme must satisfy the fol-lowing properties [23, 17, 14℄.1. If the signer signs a message, the reipient must beable to verify the signature (orretness).2. A polynomially bounded forger annot reateforged signatures that suessfully pass the veri-ation test (reipient's seurity).3. When a forger with an unlimited omputationalpower sueeds in forging a signature that passesthe veriation test, the presumed signer an on-strut a proof of forgery and onvines a third partythat a forgery has ourred (signer's seurity).4. A polynomially bounded signer annot reate a sig-nature that he an later prove to be a forgery (non-repudiability).
To ahieve the above properties, for eah publi key,there exists many mathing seret keys suh that dif-ferent seret keys reate dierent signatures on the samemessage. The real signer knows only one of the seretkeys, and an onstrut one of the many possible sig-natures. An enemy with unlimited omputing power,although an generate all the signatures but annot de-termine whih one is generated by the true signer. Thus,it would be possible for the signer to provide a proof offorgery by generating a seond signature on the messagewith a forged signature, and use the two signatures toshow the underlying omputational assumption of thesystem is broken, hene proving the forgery.Seurity of a FSS an be broken if 1) a signer an on-strut a signature that he an later prove to be a forgery,or 2) an unbounded forger sueeds in onstruting asignature that the signer annot prove that it is forged.These two types of forgeries are ompletely independentand so two dierent seurity parameters, k and , areused to show the level of seurity against the two typesof attaks. More speially, k is the seurity level ofthe reipient and  is that of the signer. It is proved[14℄ that a seure FSS is seure against adaptive hosenmessage attak and for all  > 0 and large enough k,suess probability of a polynomially bounded forger isbounded by k . For a FSS with seurity level  for thesigner, the suess probability of an unbounded forgeris limited by 2 .In the following we briey reall the general onstru-tion given in [14℄ and outline its seurity properties.2.3. The General ConstrutionThe onstrution is for a single-message fail-stop sig-nature and uses bundling homomorphisms. Bundlinghomomorphisms an be seen as a speial kind of hashfuntions.Definition 2.1. [14℄ A bundling homomorphism his a homomorphism h : G ! H between two Abeliangroups (G; +; 0) and (H; ; 1) that satises the follow-ing.1. Every image h(x) has at least 2 preimages. 2is alled bundling degree of the homomorphism.2. It is infeasible to nd ollisions, i.e., two dierentelements that are mapped to the same value by h.To give a more preise denition, we need to on-sider two families of groups, G = (GK ;+; 0) and H =(HK ;; 1), and a family of polynomial-time funtionsindexed by a key, K. The key is determined by the ap-pliation of a key generation algorithm g(k; ), on twoinput parameters k and  . The two parameters deter-mine the diÆulty of nding ollision and the bundlingdegrees of the homomorphisms, respetively. Given apair of input parameters, k;  2 N , rstly, using the keygeneration algorithm, a key K is alulated and then,GK , HK and hK are determined. For a formal def-
inition of bundling homomorphisms see Denition 4.1[14℄.A bundling homomorphism an be used to onstruta FSS sheme as follows.Let the seurity parameters of the FSS be given as kand . The bundling degree of the homomorphism,  ,will be obtained as a funtion of  as shown below.1. Prekey generation: The entre omputes K =g(k; ) and so determines a homomorphism hK ,and two groups GK and HK . Let G = GK ,H = KK and h = hK .2. Prekey veriation: The signer must be assuredthatK is a possible output of the algorithm g(k; ).This an be through providing a zero-knowledgeproof by the entre or by testing the key by thesigner. In any ase the hane of aepting a badkey must be at most 2 .3. Main key generation genA: the signer generatesher seret key sk := (sk1; sk2) by hoosing sk1 andsk2 randomly in G and omputes pk := (pk1; pk2)where pki := h(ski) for i = 1; 2.4. The message spae M is a subset of Z.5. Signing: The signature on a message m 2M is,s = sign(sk;m) = sk1 +m sk2where multiplying by m is m times addition in G.6. Testing the signature: an be performed by hek-ing, pk1  pkm2 ?= h(s)7. Proof of forgery: Given an aeptable signatures0 2 G on m suh that s0 6= sign(sk;m), the signeromputes s := sign(sk;m) and proof := (s; s0).8. Verifying proof of forgery: Given a pair (x; x0) 2GG, verify that x 6= x0 and h(x) = h(x0).Theorem 4.1 [14℄ proves that for any family ofbundling homomorphisms and any hoie of parametersthe general onstrution:1. produes orret signature;2. a polynomially bounded signer annot onstrut avalid signature and a proof of forgery;3. if an aeptable signature s 6= sign(sk;m) isfound the signer an onstrut a proof of forgery.Moreover for two hosen parameters k and , a goodprekey K and two messages m;m 2M , with m 6= m,let T := fd 2 Gjh(d) = 1 ^ (m  m)d = 0g (1)Theorem 4.2 [14℄ shows that given s = sign(sk;m) anda forged signature s 2 G suh that test(pk;m; s) =ok, the probability that s = sign(sk;m) is at mostjT j=2 and so the best hane of suess for an unre-strited forger to onstrut an undetetable forgery isbounded by jT j=2 . Thus to provide the required levelof seurity , we must hoose jT j=2  2 .
This general onstrution is the basis of all knownprovably seure onstrutions of FSS. It provides a pow-erful framework by whih proving seurity of a shemeis redued to speifying the underlying homomorphism,and determining the bundling degree and the set T .3. A NEW AND EFFICIENT FSS SCHEMEIn this setion we introdue a new FSS sheme and showthat it is an instane of the general onstrution. As willbe shown in setion 4, the sheme outperforms the mosteÆient known FSS (i.e. vHP sheme) with respet tothe message-length. Proof of forgery is by revealing theseret fators of a modulus and so verifying the proof isvery eÆient.Firstly, we desribe our sheme with a single reipientmodel, for simpliity. Then, we extend this model to amultiple reipient sheme.ModelThere is only a single reipient, R who also plays therole of the trusted entre and performs prekey genera-tion of the sheme.Prekey GenerationGiven the two seurity parameters k and , R hoosestwo large safe primes p and q. Then, R nds a primeP suh that n = pq divides P   1. Finally R seletsan element  suh that the multipliative order of modulo P is p (ordP () = p). , n and P are sent tothe signer via an authentiated hannel. (More detailson seletion of these parameters are given below.)Prekey VeriationIf the reeiver is trusted, the prekey will be aeptedby the signer S and no prekey veriation is needed(as in [24℄). On the other hand, if the reeiver is nottrusted, a zero-knowledge proof is needed to assure thatthe prekey is orret. This issue will be disussed in thenext setion (multiple reipient sheme).Key GenerationS hooses k1; k2 2 Zn and omputes1 = k1 mod P2 = k2 mod PThe private key is (k1; k2) and the publi key is (1; 2).Signing a Message xTo sign a message x 2 Zn, S omputesy = k1x+ k2 mod nand publishes y as his signature on x.Testing a Signaturey passes the test ify ?= x12 mod P
n . If  6= 1, then  has order p. This is in fat"pushing" the element ~ into a subgroup of order p.3.1. Seurity ProofWe show that this sheme is an instane of the generalonstrution with the following underlying bundling ho-momorphism family.Disrete Logarithm Bundling Homomorphism key generation g: on input k and  , two primes pand q with jqj2 =  , and jpj2  jqj2, a prime Psuh that n divides P   1 and jnj2 = k, and anelement  of order p is hosen. The key will beK = (p; q; ; P ). families of groups: Let n = pq. Dene GK = Znand HK = ZP . The homomorphism h(p;q;P ) ish(p;q;;P ) : Zn ! ZP ; h(p;q;;P )(x) = x (mod P )Disrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption [21℄Given I = (p; ; ), where p is prime,  2 Zp is aprimitive element and  2 Zp , wherea   (mod p)it is hard to nd a = log.Fatorisation Assumption [20, 21℄Given n = pq, where p and q are prime, it is hard tond a non-trivial fator of n (without the knowledge of(n) = (p  1)(q   1)).Strong Fatorisation Assumption
Given n = pq (where p and q are prime), P = tn + 1(t 2 Z and P is also prime) and  (where ordP () = p),it is hard to nd a non-trivial fator of n.This assumption is also used by Brikell and MCur-ley [3℄ although there is no proof that knowledge of of order p annot redue the hardness of fatoring n.Theorem 3.1. Under DL and Strong Fatorisationassumptions, the above onstrution (Setion 3.1) is afamily of bundling homomorphisms.Proof. To show that the above denition is a bundlinghomomorphism, we must show that1. For any  2 ZP where  =  (mod P ), thereare q preimages in Zn.2. For a given  2 ZP where  =  (mod P ), it isdiÆult to nd  suh that  =  (mod P ).3. It is hard to nd two values ; ~ 2 Zn that map tothe same value.To prove property 1, we note that knowing  = (mod P ) for  2 Zn and ordP () = p, there are exatlyq values 0, given by 0 =  + ip; i = 0;    q   1, forwhih 0 = +ip = . Hene, there are q preimagesof  in Zn.Now given  =  (mod P ), nding  is equivalentto solving an instane of DL problem, whih is hard(property 2).Property 3 means that it is diÆult to nd  and ~suh that  = ~ (mod P ). Suppose that there isa probabilisti polynomial-time algorithm ~A that ouldompute suh a ollision. Then, we onstrut an algo-rithm ~D that on input (P; n; ), where njP  1, outputsthe non-trivial fators of n as follows:First, ~D runs ~A, and if ~A outputs a ollision, i.e. yand ~y, y 6= ~y suh that y  ~y (mod P ), then ~Domputes: y = ~y mod Py = ~y mod py   ~y = ̂p ̂ 2 Zp = gd(y   ~y; n)~D is suessful with the same probability as ~A and al-most equally eÆient. Hene, it ontradits with thestrong fatorisation assumption.Theorem 3.2. Our FSS sheme is seure for thesigner.Aording to the Theorem 4.1 in [14℄, we must ndthe size of the set T :T := fd 2 Znjd = 1 ^ (m  m)d = 0gor T := fd 2 Znjd = 1 ^ m0d = 0gin ZP . There are exatly q d's that satisfy the rstequation d = 1 mod P . Sine m 6= m, we have m0 2
holds.Proof of ForgeryIf there is a forged signature y0 whih passes the test,the presumed sender an generate his own signature,namely y, on the same message, and the following equa-tion will hold: y = y0 mod Por y = y0 mod py   y0 = p;  2 ZHene, a non-trivial fator of n an be found by om-puting gd(y  y0; n). We note that the probability of yis equal to y0 is 1=q.We make the following remarks on the key generationalgorithm. In [10℄, it is shown that for a randomly se-leted n, P suh that n divides P   1 is upper boundedby n log22n. Moreover if jnj2 = k, then on average ittakes O(log k) probabilisti steps to nd suh a P . Anelement  is seleted suh that the multipliative orderof  modulo P is p (ordP () = p). This element anbe easily found, by for example, randomly hoosing anelement ~ 2 ZP and alulating  = (~)q mod P , for = P 1
f1; 2;   n 1g and so there is a unique message (namely,m0 = q) that satises m0d = 0 (mod n). Hene, jT j =1. Together with theorem 4.2 [14℄, this implies that itsuÆes to hoose  =  in the proposed sheme, as wedid in setion 3.3.2. Multiple Reipient ShemeAlthough we have restrited ourselves to single reip-ient, but it is not diÆult to extend the sheme tomultiple reipients. In fat, the only dierene in thatase is to inlude a trusted enter and provide zero-knowledge proofs that show that the hosen parame-ters of the prekey have the orret forms. That is weneed to ensure that n, P and , have the desired forms.Using [4℄, an element n an be proven to be an RSAmodulus n = pq, where both p and q are safe primes.Then, P is tested for primality. This an be done byusing various primality testing algorithms suh as theMiller-Rabin probabilisti primality test [21℄ whih runsin polynomial time. Finally it is veried that n dividesP   1. Although it is easy to show that the order of is a multiple of p (without knowing p, for exampleby verifying n ?= 1 (mod P )), but showing that theorder is stritly p needs more eort. We an ahievethe zero knowledge proof of ordP () = p by ombiningthe idea mentioned in setion 3.2 and 4.2 of [4℄. Morepreisely, the prover has to prove that he knows p thatsatises p = 1 mod P , and p is a prime number. Onthe other hand, after verifying this proof, the reeiver(or the sender in the ontext of this paper) only needsto hek whether n ?= 1 mod P , and hene, provingthat p = 1 mod P .4. OPTIMALITY AND EFFICIENCYThe aim of this setion is to ompare eÆieny of ourproposed sheme with those of the best known FSSshemes. EÆieny of a fail-stop signature system hasbeen measured in terms of three length parameters: thelengths of the seret key, the publi key and the signa-ture, and the amount of omputation required in eahase. Later in this setion, we introdue a new mea-sure, eÆieny with respet to message length whihorresponds to eÆient use of ommuniation hannel.Pedersen and Ptzmann [14℄ proved that if the seuritylevel of the sender is  and N messages are to be signed,then the size of length parameters are lower bounded by(N+1)( 1),  and 2 1, respetively. These boundsdo not depend on the seurity level of the reeiver whihis measured by the parameter k and determines the sizeof the of the underlying hard problem(s).Definition 4.1. [14℄ A FSS sheme with seurity pa-rameters k and  is alled optimal with respet to seretkey length, publi key length or the signature length, ifthe lower bound on the orresponding parameter is sat-
ised with equality.A ComparisonTo ompare two FSS's we x the level of seurity pro-vided by the two shemes and nd the size of the threelength parameters, and the number of operations (forexample multipliation) required for signing and test-ing.Table 1 gives the results of omparison of four FSSshemes when the seurity levels of the reeiver and thesender are given by k and , respetively. In this om-parison, the rst two shemes (rst and seond olumnof the table) are hosen beause they have provable se-urity. The rst sheme, referred to as vHP in this pa-per, is the most eÆient provably seure sheme. Thethird sheme, although does not have a omplete seu-rity proof (although it is not diÆult to onstrut suha proof), is inluded beause it has an expliit proofof forgery by revealing the seret fators of a modu-lus. Column four orresponds to the sheme proposedin this paper.We use the same value of  and k for all the sys-tems and determine the size of the three length param-eters. The hard underlying problem in all four shemesare DL, Subgroup DL [12℄ and/or Fatorisation. Thismeans the same level of reeiver's seurity (given by thevalue of parameter k) translates into into dierent sizeprimes and moduli. In partiular, the seurity level of a151 bits subgroup disrete logarithm with basi primesof at least 1881 bits, is the same as fatorisation of a1881 bits RSA modulus [12℄.To nd the required size of primes in vHP sheme,assuming seurity parameters (k; ) are given, rstK = max(k; ) is found and then the prime q is hosensuh that jqj2  K. The bundling degree in this shemeis q and the value of p is hosen suh that qjp   1 and(p 1)=q be upper-bounded by a polynomial in K (page237 and 238 [17℄). The size of jpj2 must be hosen a-ording to standard disrete logarithm problem, whihfor adequate seurity must be at least 1881 bits [12℄.However, the size of jqj2 an be hosen as low as 151bits [12℄. Sine jpj2 and jqj2 are to some extent inde-pendent, we use K̂ to denote jpj2.In our proposed sheme bundling degree and heneseurity level of the sender is jqj2. The seurity of thereeiver is determined by the diÆulty of DL in ZP andfatorisation of n. Assume jpj2  jqj2  jnj22 . Thenwe rst nd Nk whih is the modulus size for whihfatorisation has diÆulty k. Now sine P  n, DLin ZP will have diÆulty k [12℄ and we hoose K =max (Nk2 ; ), jqj2 = K  jpj2 and P  n. With thesehoies the sender and reeiver level of seurity is atleast  and k, respetively. For example for (k; ) =(151; 151), we rst nd N151 = 1881 [12℄ and hooseK = max (1881=2; 151) = 941 whih results in jpj2 jqj2  941 and jnj2  jP j2  1882. Sine jP j2 an behosen muh greater than jnj2, we use K̂ to denote jP j2,and so when jP j2  jnj2, we have K̂  2K.
2(   1)
In the fatorisation sheme of [14℄, the seurity levelof the sender,  satises  =  +  where  is thebundling degree and 2 is the size of the message spae.The seurity parameter of the reeiver, k, is determinedby the diÆulty of fatoring the modulus n. Now fora given pair of seurity parameters, (k; ), the size ofmodulus Nk is determined by k but determining  re-quires knowledge of the size of the message spae. As-sume  = jpj2  jqj2 = Nk=2. This means that =  + Nk=2. Now the eÆieny parameters of thesystem an be given as shown in the table. In partiu-lar the size of seret and publi keys are 2( +Nk) and2Nk respetively.In RSA-based FSS sheme [22℄,  = j(n)j2, and se-urity of the reeiver is determined by the diÆulty offatoring n. This means that   jnj2. To design a sys-tem with seurity parameters (k; ), rst Nk, the mod-ulus size that provides seurity level k for the reeiver isdetermined and then K = max(; jNkj2). The modulusn is hosen suh that jnj2 = K. With this hoie, thesystem provides adequate seurity for the sender andthe reeiver. DL[24℄ Fat[14℄ RSA[22℄ Our FSSPK(mult) 4K 2K 4K 4KSign 2 K 2 1(mult)Test 3K 2K +  3K 4K(mult)Length of 4K 4K + 2 4K 4KSK(bits)Length ofPK(bits) 2K̂ 2K 2K 2K̂Length of 2K 2K +  4K 2Ka signature(bits)PrekeyLength K + 3K̂ 3K 3K 2(K + K̂)Length of K K K 2Ka message(bits)Min size of 151 941 1881 941K(bits)[12℄Min size of 1881 n/a n/a 1881K̂(bits)[12℄Underlying DL Fat RSA DLhard & FatProblemTable 1. Comparison of omputation (number ofmultipliations) and eÆieny parametersThe table shows that beause of the subgroup DLproblem, K in vHP sheme an be as low as 151 bits,while in our sheme it must be at least 941 bits. K̂ invHP and our sheme must be at least 1881 bits [12℄.Table 2 shows that performane of vHP and oursheme are nearly the same with respet to the lower
bounds given in [14℄, and in fat both shemes are nearly(nearly ahieving the bounds) optimal with respet tothe signature length.DL[24℄ Our FSS Lower BoundLength of SK 4K = 4 4K = 4Length of PK 2K̂ 2K̂ Signature Length 2K = 2 2K = 2 2   1Table 2. Comparison between vHP, our sheme andoptimal lower bound for N = 1EÆieny with respet to the message-lengthIn pratie, we also need to onsider relative lengths ofthe message and the signature. If the length of the sig-nature and the message are denoted by jyj2 and jxj2respetively, ̂ = jyj2=jxj2 is a measure of ommunia-tion eÆieny of the sheme. For example ̂ = 1 meansthat to authentiate one bit information, one bit extra(signature) must be sent over the hannel.Now in our sheme messages and signatures are bothfrom Zn and so ̂ = 1. In vHP sheme messages andsignatures belong to subgroups of size q and 2jqj2 re-spetively. This means that ̂ = 2 and so to authen-tiate one bit message 2 bits signature must be used.In the fatorisation sheme of [14℄, messages are  bits,and signatures are k++ bits. Assuming that k = ,then ̂ > 2. In the RSA based FSS in [22℄, messages be-long to Zn and signature are of size 4jnj2. This meansthat ̂ = 4.Table 3 summarises these results.DL[24℄ Fat[14℄ RSA[22℄ Our FSS̂ 2 > 2 4 1Table 3. Comparison of ommuniation eÆieny withrespet to the message-lengthSigning Long MessagesTables 1 and 3 show that the size of the input to the sig-nature algorithm in vHP and our sheme areK and 2K,that is at least 151 and 1882 bits ([12℄), respetively. Formessages longer than these sizes hash-then-enrypt [14℄method an be used. This has two impats. To prove forgery, rather than showing that the un-derlying assumption of the sheme is broken it willbe shown that a ollision for the ollision-resistanthash funtion used for hashing is found. The hash funtion must be based on a omputa-tional assumption. Hash funtions with this prop-erty, developed in [5, 6℄, require on average onemodular multipliation for one bit of the messageand so drastially redue the speed of signaturegeneration and testing.
The above points imply that signing a message oflength ` bits, 151 < ` < 1882, using vHP requires onaverage ` more modular multipliations ompared toour sheme.4.1. Multiple MessagesWe an extend our sheme to sign more than one mes-sage without hanging the key using the method in [24℄.Suppose t  1 messages are to be signed.The signer hooses a seret key k0; k1;    ; kt 1 2 Zn,and publishes the orresponding publi key(0; 1; 2;    ; t 1) = (k0 ; k1 ; k2 ;    ; kt 1)where i 2 ZP ; i = 0; 1    t  1.To sign a message x 2 Zn, S omputesy = k0 + k1x+ k2x2 +   + kt 1xt 1 mod nThe signature y passes the veriation test ify ?= 0x1x22   xt 1t 1 mod PUsing theorem 4.4 of [13℄, it an be proved that thesigner has unonditional seurity after issuing signa-tures on t  1 dierent messages.5. CONCLUSIONSIn this paper, we proposed a new fail-stop signaturesheme that uses two omputational assumptions. Ituses disrete logarithm and fatorisation as the under-lying assumptions for reipient's seurity, and fatori-sation as the underlying assumption for the proof offorgery. If either of the two assumptions is broken, asignature an be easily forged and so the seurity of thesystem will be lost.The proof of forgery is by revealing the non-trivialfators of the modulus and so results in a fast veri-ation proess. We showed that the sheme an beextended for signing multiple messages.We ompared our sheme with the best known FSSsheme, namely the vHP sheme, and two other shemeswhih are based on the diÆulty of fatorisation. Theomparison learly shows that our sheme is more ef-ient than the other fatorisation based shemes, andits performane is very similar to the vHP sheme.We introdued a new measure of eÆieny for FSSthat is related to eÆient use of ommuniation han-nel and showed that with respet to this measure, oursheme has better performane than vHP sheme andthe FSS shemes based on fatorisation. We showedthat ompared to vHP sheme, our sheme is more ef-ient for signing messages of up to 1881 bits.REFERENCES[1℄ N. Bari'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